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Cognitive Science has positioned itself to be a 
common ground in which models of mental processes 
from multiple disciplines merge, situating itself as a 
common field for new learning theories, or for 
formalizing existing ones. However, the authors have 
identified a need for updating the existing graphical 
representations by incorporating more accessible 
understanding for teachers and researchers in cross-
multidisciplinary fields. In this regard, the present 
investigation attempts to generate a standard 
graphical language to represent complex mental 
processes by the introduction of functional 
principles, schemes and models that have been 
successfully used in technical areas such as adaptive 
control systems, algorithm flow charts, and artificial 
intelligence. This graphical representation, entitled 
“Cognitive Functional Representation” (CFR), is 
further shown to be efficacious in incorporating the 




Cognitive Science has addressed modelling and 
validating theories in sciences ranging from Biology 
to Neuroscience, and from Psychology and Artificial 
Intelligence [1]. Absorbing and reviewing these 
theories in different contexts, Cognitive Science has 
positioned itself as a common ground in which 
models of mental processes from multiple disciplines 
merge. However, the authors have identified a need 
for more complete, graphic representations that 
incorporate developments in the field, and potentially 
make these theories more widely accessible for 
teachers and researchers. Since the first proposition 
of mental representation, such as Johnson-Laird’s 
reasoning models [2], most advances have been 
focused on the topic of knowledge representation in 
the fields of artificial intelligence and cognitive 
informatics [3]. 
While graphical representation of mental models 
and their processes are needed for a better 
understanding of the different theories, the analysis, 
evaluation and integration of the models usually do 
not deal with actual teaching purposes across 
multidisciplinary fields. In this regard, this 
investigation attempts to generate a standard 
graphical language to represent complex mental 
processes by the introduction of functional 
principles, schemes and models, which have 
previously been successfully used in technical areas 
such as adaptive control systems, algorithm flow 
diagrams, or artificial intelligence. This graphical 
representation, named by the authors as “Cognitive 
Functional Representation” (CFR), is further shown 
to be efficacious in incorporating aspects of complex 
theories such as Jean Piaget’s Theory of Intellectual 
Development. 
 
2. Types of cognitive representation 
models 
 
To understand how generic cognitive models can 
be graphically represented, one must understand the 
types of possible representations describing cognitive 
processes. 
Cognitive models and processes are formed by 
static components such as concepts, facts, etc., and 
dynamic components like skills, habits, procedures, 
intentions, actions, speech, stimuli, attention, 
sensation, perception, memories, awareness, 
emotions, feeling, behavior, experiences, tasks, 
thoughts, reasoning, ideas, beliefs, values, attitudes, 
instruction, scaffolding, insight, etc. 
In Thomas Hobbes’ Representational Theory of 
the Mind (RTM), he stated that knowledge is the 
evidence of truth, and which must have four 
properties [4]: first, knowledge must be integrated by 
concepts; second, each concept can be identified by a 
name; third, names can be used to create 
propositions; and fourth, such propositions must be 
concluding. RTM was the first formalization of this 
philosophy [5], and Jerry Fodors’ Language of 
Though Hypothesis is one its latest extensions, 
stating that thoughts are represented by a language 
supported by the principles of symbolic logic [6]. 
In Osherson and Smith’s “Classic Theory of 
Concept Representation” [7], the theory defines 
concepts as the representation of a mental object and 
a set of attributes, expressed through a specific 
language of the mind by symbols or patterns, but 
also considering descriptive capabilities, in the same 
manner as in Murphy and Medin’s “Concepts as 
Theory Dependent” [8]. 
In Psychology, some of the theories to understand 
and interpret mental processes are the associative 
theories, also referred to as connectionist theories, 
the cognitive theories, and the constructivist theories. 
Behaviorists do not consider internal cognitive 
processes, but only external behaviors to different 
stimulus, and for this reason, behaviorist theories 
cannot explain thought in desired depth [9]. 
Connectionist theories state that knowledge can 
be described as a number of interconnected concepts, 
with each concept connected through associations. 
These are the roots of semantics as the means for 
knowledge representation [10]. Semantic knowledge 
and similarity representation have been proven to be 
drivers of reasoning for unstructured knowledge 
[11,12]. Traditional connectionist approaches do not 
account for causality, but they focus on the presence 
or lack of associations and their amount, suggesting 
that these theories may not explain higher cognitive 
processes. 
Constructivist theories consider more complex 
reasoning components, such as causality, probability 
and context. In this approach, each group of 
associations integrates different layers of thought 
differentiated by the strength of their associations. In 
the highest layer are found the concepts, and in the 
lowest layers, the ideas [10]. This structure leads to 
representations of complex mechanisms. 
Brown [13] states that knowledge is composed of 
theories, causal explanation, meaningful solutions 
and arbitrary solutions. Theories are networks of 
concepts, causal explanations are facts, meaningful 
solutions are isolated pieces of knowledge and 
arbitrary solutions are random decisions. 
Other approaches include Doignon and 
Falmagne’s Knowledge Space Theory [14], which 
defines knowledge as a group of questions, which are 
combined with possible answers to form knowledge 
states, where their combinations create a congruent 
framework for knowledge. 
The common components in all these theories for 
knowledge and thought representation consider the 
following [3]: 
1. Knowledge is composed of concepts, which 
have attributes and network structures. 
2. Concepts have associations with other 
concepts, and the associations have characteristics 
such as type, directionality, name, intension, 
extension, among others. 
3. Associations and concepts lead to dynamic 
structures, which tend to become stable through time, 
becoming factual knowledge. 
Concepts, associations and their structures apply 
for both factual (declarative) knowledge, and process 
(procedural) knowledge, although they are more 
natural to see in factual knowledge, since in 
processes, concepts are integrated and usually 
referred to as skills and competencies, and their 
relations are associated with rule sets. Structured 
knowledge strongly relies on information analysis 
using higher cognitive processes. Unstructured 
knowledge relies on lower cognitive processes such 
as associative knowledge and similarity [12,15,16]. 
Unstructured knowledge becomes structured when 
higher cognitive processes such as acquisition, 
ordering taxonomy, domain, direction of causality, 
and associations, among others, are applied. Even 
though some computer systems may undertake this 
process with semantic networks and Bayesian 
causality networks, they only accomplish it on an 
intuitive basis [12]. These, then, are the main 
building blocks of cognitive representations. 
Knowledge representation is deeply linked to 
learning and reasoning processes, for example, 
Crisp-Bright [12] defines knowledge as “the 
psychological result of perception, learning and 
reasoning”. Following this definition, in order to 
have any higher-level cognitive process, knowledge 
must be generated, represented, and stored. Both 
Newell’s Unified Theories of Cognition [17] and 
Anderson’s Adaptive Character of Thought [18], 
have strongly influenced today’s cognitive 
representation models. In the Cognitive Informatics 
Theoretical Framework [19], the authors state 
“computerized knowledge representations are 
required in order to develop computerized systems 
with cognitive capabilities” [20]. 
Metacognition, a key cognitive process meaning 
cognition about cognition [21], has two fundamental 
aspects: metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive 
activity. Metacognitive knowledge involves 
monitoring and reflecting on one’s current thoughts, 
which includes factual knowledge, such as 
knowledge about the task, and one’s goals, and 
strategic knowledge, such as how and when 
consciously manage specific procedures to solve 
problems [22]. 
The most important types of cognitive 
representation models are symbolic, non-symbolic, 
declarative, and distributed (neural or probabilistic) 
networks, among others [3]. They differ in their 
suitability for representing types of reasoning, such 
as inductive, deductive, analogy, abduction, etc. [23]. 
Symbolic representation models include 
structures such as semantic networks, rule-based 
systems, frames, scripts and ontology-based concept 
maps. 
Semantic networks are basically concept 
networks, where the concepts are represented as 
nodes, and associations as arcs [24], and can be 
defined as a graphical equivalent for propositional 
logic [25]. This type of representation model 
strongly relies on similarity, contrast and closeness 
for conceptual representation or interpretation. In 
semantic networks, associations have a grade that 
represents the strength of the association. In this 
way, learning is presented by increasing the 
association grade, or creating new associations 
between concepts.  
Semantic networks are based on the traditional 
Representational Theory of the Mind and associative 
theories. They are mainly used to model declarative 
knowledge both in structured and unstructured ways, 
but they also can be used for procedural knowledge. 
When modelling structured knowledge, the 
associations are directed, including causality and 
hierarchy. Traditional semantic networks only used 
presence or absence of associations, however 
semantic networks such as MultiNet or Object 
Attribute Relation [26] provide deeper types of 
associations and integrate layers for knowledge 
composition. 
Ruled-based systems are representation models 
focusing mainly on procedural knowledge, but they 
may be also used for classification purposes in 
declarative knowledge. They are organized as 
libraries of rules in the form of condition–action, or 
if–then–else sentences. Rule systems are excellent in 
representing skills, learning and problem solving 
[27,18]. 
Frames are data-structures representing 
stereotyped situations [28]. Frames are a kind of 
semantic network, combining declarative and 
structured procedural knowledge. Frames differ from 
networks in that they can include procedures. Every 
frame symbol contains a procedure (demons) [28], 
and a group of attributes for the situation description. 
The purpose of the frame is to emulate the human 
memory, which stores situations, combining 
procedural and declarative knowledge. This 
approach is an attempt to unify different approaches 
in psychology, linguistics and artificial intelligence. 
Scripts are similar to frames. In Schank's theory 
of Scripts [29], scripts are sentences describing an 
action. Script theory was originally addressed to 
understand human language with episodic memory. 
Scripts are descriptions of a larger plan, which can 
also be used to model networks similar to those of 
semantic networks. Schank later used scripts in his 
Dynamic Memory Model [30] to explain higher 
aspects of cognition. 
Neural networks are the most important types of 
distributed representation models, which use 
symbols to represent concepts, as well as neuron-like 
activation patterns to identify concepts or ideas. 
Neural networks emulate the cognitive process of 
mental reconstruction of general idea patterns even if 
specific concept parts are lost in the process, and 
strengthening the patterns every time the brain thinks 
(referring this as training of the network). Both 
symbolic and distributed systems use concepts as 
units of knowledge. The difference is that symbolic 
models represent concepts as symbols, and the 
distributed ones as patterns. Both approaches use 
associations between concepts, and their association 
configuration as knowledge representation. 
Ontology-based concept maps are explicit 
specifications of conceptualizations, or abstract, 
simplified views of the world [31]. Ontologies are 
flexible hierarchical structures in first order logic, 
defining relations between elements. Ontologies are 
agreements in social contexts to accomplish guiding 
objectives [32]. Ontologies also apply to 
folksonomies [33]. Their implementations resemble 
taxonomies or concept networks [34], i.e., semantic 
networks with formal conceptual descriptions for 
their associations, and hence, can be considered as 
symbolic systems. Ontologies may also include 
additional layers for the representation of concept 
embodiment. 
 
4. Examples of representation models 
 
The best representation models from the 
qualitative and quantitative point of view are found 
in the field of Artificial Intelligence, which are also 
known as knowledge representation models. In these 
models, associations are vital to knowledge 
representation in these representation models 
[5,6,10,35,36], the differences are in their properties 
and implications. 
Most factual knowledge representations use 
propositional logic or its graphical equivalents in 
network representations. The specific type of 
network is determined by its association 
directionality [37], association type [38], inclusion of 
association cycles, hierarchies, grouping schemes, 
and their combinations. 
The capacity to represent multiple contexts in a 
single representative example or instantiation, and 
the impact that context changes have on a concept’s 
meaning are important representation functionalities. 
The Micro-theories models used in a “Cyc” 
commonsense knowledge base [39] contemplate 
these features, combining multiple facts of a 
subjective nature into a coherent knowledge base. 
However, Cyc has proven to be a problem for most 
users [40], since it requires a specialized language 
based on predicate logic semantics for information 
modelling and extraction. 
Graphical-oriented models such as MultiNet [37] 
or Object Attribute Relation (OAR) [26] have been 
used for natural language processing, knowledge 
composition, and process specification, however, 
their focus is not to represent several contexts at a 
time. MultiNet has specific context differentiators 
based on grammar attributes, but not for concept 
meaning in changing contexts. Only a small fraction 
of concept information is usually reused, and the 
majority has to be rewritten for each domain. OAR 
shows a similar situation since the context is defined 
as a relation between objects and their attributes [26], 
but OAR is more flexible, and includes multiple 
contexts, however, not for the concepts. The 
concepts themselves are not dynamic, but the context 
objects. In consequence, a concept can have several 
different instantiations depending on the context. 
The Memory Map (MM) model is a knowledge 
model that represents the interaction of concepts and 
skills in different contexts, including concepts with 
changing meaning according to contexts [3]. MM 
models are directed graphs similar to semantic 
networks and ontologies but with context flexibility; 
open granularity subject to modeler’s criteria; 
arbitrary level of atomicity for each concept; and 
dynamic hierarchies changing for each domain. This 
type of representation model deserves a more 
detailed explanation, since it is the closest model to 
the one proposed by the authors.  
The MM model is composed of concept 
representation units (CRU) represented as round 
nodes; Skill Representation Units (SRU) represented 
as square or rectangular nodes; and Associations 
among them represented as arcs. The concept and 
skill attributes together with their associations define 
the semantics and the corresponding knowledge. 
Concept meaning changes depending on the 
attributes tagged to corresponding domains. 
Concepts and skills have levels of knowledge, which 
are thresholds indicating the structure strength (weak 
syncretic or strong and stable, conceptual). Unlike 
concepts, only skills’ associations have an 
application-oriented nature. Associations also 
include a level of strength. Attributes are a 
combination between concepts and associations. 
There is no distinction between objects and 
instantiations. The context (embodiment of semantic 
knowledge) is composed of one or several domains. 
Associations must belong to at least one domain, and 
by the combination of multiple domains, different 
contexts are formed. 
Knowledge extraction is done by simple unguided 
recursive searches that return relevant model 
segments. Model’s focus is to easily access 
information for open queries such as: knowledge 
about certain concept or skill, concept’s attributes, 
relation of concepts under a particular domain, etc. 
New knowledge is acquired by associating it to 
existing knowledge. 
The MM model has the following properties:  
1) There is an unlimited number of levels 
(granularity).  
2) Concepts and skills can be integrated into 
hierarchies through roles and directionalities. The 
combination of hierarchical domains generates new 
dynamic context-dependent hierarchies 
(taxonomies).  
3) The network is developed succinctly, avoiding 
redundancy, and delimited by contexts.  
4) There is no limit for the number of units, 
hierarchy of attributes and associations, or 
knowledge depth in a structure.  
5) The structure is flexible, creating associations 
between any unit, and any association can have 
several roles each offering a unique behavior. 
The model has some restrictions:  
1) A domain may appear isolated (secluded 
knowledge), however this is because an association 
may link certain concept or skill to a structure of a 
different domain that cannot be seen.  
2) Associations must always be linked to units.  
3) New concept or skill representation units must 
be created first, then their associations. 
An example of a detailed MM Model for an 
advanced learning environment can be consulted in 
Ramirez and Valdes’ “General Knowledge 
Representation Model” [3]. The model adapts user 
profiles, containing user knowledge, interest, 
learning styles and emotional profiles. 
Certain similarities of knowledge representation 
models can be seen in Carchiolo et al. [41], and Van 
Marcke’s approaches [42]. 
 Specific knowledge representation models 
applied to education are the Intelligent Computer 
Aided Instruction ICAI [43], Adaptive Hypermedia 
[44], and the Intelligent Tutoring System ITS [43]. 
 
2. The Cognitive Functional 
Representation (CFR) Model 
 
The Cognitive Functional Representation (CFR) 
Model is a symbolic representation model suitable 
for representing complex cognitive concepts and 
processes with the following characteristics: 
• Directed associations with hierarchies, causality, 
and sequential logic. 
• Explicit input/output information, comparisons, 
feedback loops, and disturbance inputs affecting 
the cognitive process. 
• Functional blocks, their attributes representing 
concepts, skills, experiences, contexts, and 
processes, as well as open granularity subject to 
criteria and concept atomicity. 
• Special focus on effective Learning Loops or 
association cycles emulating the cognitive 
process of mental reconstruction of knowledge 
(constructivism). 
• Capability to represent not only factual or 
declarative knowledge, but easily represent 
dynamic structures, strategic and procedural 
knowledge, and consequently, skills and 
competencies related to rule-based sets. 
• Representation of both factual and procedural 
knowledge of mainly structured knowledge of 
higher cognitive processes (acquisition, 
taxonomy, domain, direction causality, and 
association), but also unstructured knowledge of 
lower cognitive processes (such as associativity 
and similarity). 
• Graphical representation of association strength 
and potentiality to represent complex network 
structures and cognitive representation processes 
such as inductive, deductive, analogy and 
abduction reasoning. 
Each of these aspects represents novel graphical 
representation standards that are depicted in the 
following section with an example.  
Besides the unifying approaches in psychology, 
linguistics and artificial intelligence, CFR also 
integrates the approaches of Adaptive Control 
Systems. 
The CFR does not include propositional logic, 
and quantitative aspects such as association 
strengths, and activation patterns at this stage, but it 
may be further developed in the future. 
 
3. Explaining Jean Piaget’s Theory of 
Intellectual Growth in One Minute 
 
The title of this section is to raise awareness about 
the power of CFR modeling in explaining complex 
theories such as Jean Piaget’s Theory of Intellectual 
Growth [45-49], which was selected as a 
constructivist jewel, flagship of the cognitive 
sciences. This model is shown in the Annex at the 
end of the paper. 
As it can be seen, a classical Adaptive Control 
System seems very suitable to represent Jean 
Piaget’s theory. Besides meeting the traditional 
properties of the semantic networks and advanced 
models such as the Memory Map Model, the CFR 
model introduces new properties to the model: 
• “Feedback Loops” that acquire the perceptions 
from reality by sensing stimuli, events and 
experiences, but also after the preliminary 
Assimilation of the reality. 
• “Comparison Function” between the recent 
acquisition of the reality with the knowledge of 
the existing mental schemes. 
• “Learning Actions”, such as the association 
arrow coming from “Knowledge Construction” 
to “Accommodation” by the modification of the 
existing schemes to account for the new 
experiences, and promoting intellectual growth. 
The “Learning Action” arrow is usually 
represented by diagonally crossing through the 
block that is to be enriched or modified. 
Learning actions are also common in neural 
networks and deep learning algorithms used in 
artificial intelligence. The application of CFR 
suggests that a “Learning Action” arrow is 
missing for the “Assimilation” block. 
• “Input signals”, which, by the way, are not 
provided in Piaget’s theory, but that can easily 
result as consequence of using such adaptive 
control system, where for example, the signals 
may be seen as “inquiries”, “goals”, “orders”, 
etc. 
• Regarding output signals, any outcome arrow 
leaving from a block unit can be considered as 
an output signal in control systems. In the model 
presented in the Annex, the output is the 
“Equilibrium of Cognitive Structures”. 
Besides, other elements are added to enrich the 
proposed model: 
• “Influential Factor” associations represented as 
“lightning” symbols are meant to affect a 
process by the direct or indirect action of other 
factors. A number of lightning symbols can be 
used to represent the level of influence or 
“strength” of the association in the process in a 
more visual fashion. 
• “Clouds” are meant to represent factors that may 
directly or indirectly affect a process, such as the 
“External Environment”. The CFR model also 
helps to identify deficiencies in the represented 
model, since it may be suggested that an 
additional “cloud” may be missing above the 
“Existing Model” that may include “Beliefs”, 
“Values” and “Memories”, among others, that 
drive or may affect the existing model. 
There are other CFR elements that are not included 
in the application example due to its specific nature, 
but that may be used in other more procedural 





After a summary of the main types of representation 
models used for cognitive processes, a description of 
main specific examples of representation models and 
their properties, a novel graphical representation 
standard has been introduced and applied to the 
representation of a complex cognitive theory, such as 
Jean Piaget’s Theory of Intellectual Growth. 
The application of CFR to the concrete case of 
Piaget’s theory unveils novel properties such as: 
“Feedback Loops” acquiring perceptions from 
reality; “Comparison Function” between existing and 
actual schemes; “Learning Action” association 
arrows that modify existing schemes and that directly 
account for the new experiences and intellectual 
growth; “Input signals”; “Influential Factor” 
associations directly or indirectly affecting a process 
and introducing “strength” of the association; 
“Clouds” representing factors directly or indirectly 
affecting a process; “Milestones” and “Hierarchies”. 
The application of the CFR model to Piaget’s 
theory unveiled as well the unexpected outcome 
demonstrating that CFR can be used to detect 
deficiencies of original represented models while 
they are mapped into an adaptive control system, 
such as a missing “cloud” above the “Existing 
Model” that might include “Beliefs”, “Values” and 
“Memories”, among others, that drive or affect the 
existing model; inputs to the theory; and lack of a 
“Learning Action” for the “Assimilation” block. 
At this stage, the CFR includes mainly qualitative 
properties and not propositional logic, and 
quantitative aspects such as quantitative association 
strengths, and activation patterns, but this may be 
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